Multi-dimensional Security Management and Enforcement (MSME) Project

Introduction

The Multi-dimensional Security Management and Enforcement (MSME) project will design and implement a system to efficiently provide communications security by supporting the creation, management, evolution, and dissolution of dynamic coalitions. The MSME project at BBN Technologies is sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under contract number F30602-00-C-0062 issued by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL).

Approach

The approach is to build a Security Abstraction Layer (SAL) that is based in part on the ISO security architecture (ISO 7498-2). Additional services and mechanisms not defined in ISO 7498-2 (for example, a transitive communications service between coalition members and a steganography mechanism) are included in MSME, as well as both TLS and IPsec mechanisms.

The policy of a coalition will be specified by each coalition partner specifying a Policy Level Agreement (PLA) that defines the communications security requirements that the partner will use when communicating with other coalition partners.

MSME Coalition Policy Resolution Components
MSME Coalition Policy Resolution Components

A PLA will be expressed in a common PLA Language (PLAL). Each partner will translate (if necessary) the coalition-relevant portions of its policy into the PLAL. The PLAs of each partner will be securely communicated between the partners and resolved, creating a Resolved PLA (RPLA). The resolution process removes mechanisms from the PLAs of the partners that do not allow successful inter-partner communications. The RPLA is securely communicated back to each partner, where it is reconciled with the original PLA to verify concistency. The RPLA is then translated (if necessary) back to the partner's local policy support system, so that it can be used to eliminate those mechanism alternatives that will not result in successful inter-partner communications.

The RPLA is also used to augment the filters used by a partner's intrusion detection mechanisms so that the partner can make sure that the resolved policy is being used and enforced.

Issues that arise when multiple partners form a dynamic coalition that were not addressed by PBSM include:

Specification Language
The language used to specify the security policies of each host needs to be able to specify which policy to use depending upon what other hosts are currently members of the coalition. The language must also be able to specify policies at a higher-level of abstraction than was necessary for two communicating hosts, so that the policies can be more flexible to adjust to changing coalitions. However, additional flexibility leaves open the possibility that policies might be ambiguous. The language will have to include meta policies that indicate how to resolve any ambiguities that may arise.

Exchange of Policies
The policies specified by each of the coalition partners must be securely exchanged with each of the other partners of the coalition. Policies may have to be exchanged whenever a host enters or leaves the coalition. An encoding of the policies is necessary along with a protocol used for their exchange. Each policy must be authenticated to verify which host sent the policy and that the policy has not been modified in transport. Confidentiality may also be required.

MSME Coalition Policy Resolution Information Flow

MSME Coalition Policy Resolution Information Flow

Negotiation of Policies
Using policy information from each of the current coalition partners, policy negotiation is required to decide on a common policy that satisfies all of the partner's requirements. This may either be an active negotiation requiring rounds of policy exchange or it may be a static negotiation where each policy has all the information needed to make the decision without further policy exchange. After a common policy is negotiated, each partner of the coalition must get a copy of the resolved policy for its local use. Policies may need to be re-negotiated whenever a partner enters or leaves the coalition since the set of policies, which are involved in the negotiation, may change. Consider the case where a partner that was providing transit communicatins services leaves the coalition. This dynamic nature of the coalitions requires that the policy negotiations be fast so that the policy generation process can keep pace with the changes to the coalition.

Policy Verification
It is essential to be able to determine if security policies are behaving as desired. In the case of two hosts communicating, it is fairly easy to determine if the policies interact in a desired fashion before the policies are activated, or communication is initiated. However, when dynamic coalitions are involved, complete verification before using the policies is extremely difficult, since the policy used might depend on all the hosts in the coalition and the coalition may often be in flux. It is also desireable to verify that policy decision points and policy enforcement points are handling the policies correctly. To do this, it is necessary to monitor the policies in use, both the results of the negotiations and the results of enforcing the policies.


Further Information about MSME

  Releases

MSME release 0.9: release announcement | download code
MSME release 0.5: release announcement | download code

  Papers

Date Format Title/Description
12/19/2001 ps | pdf MSME Roadmap
11/03/2000 ps | pdf MSME Requirements
12/17/2001 ps | pdf MSME Architecture
10/10/2000 ps | pdf Policy Resolution Tradeoffs
10/11/2000 ps | pdf MSME Protocol Issues
12/04/2001 ps | pdf MSME Policy Level Agreement Language
11/20/2000 ps | pdf Security Abstraction Layer for MSME Interpretation
03/29/2001 ps | pdf MSME Security Abstraction Layer Schemata
11/29/2001 ps | pdf A Data Model and Language Representation for SSL/TLS Policies
12/18/2001 ps | pdf Transfer Protocols for MSME
12/26/2001 ps | pdf Coalition Policy Resolution Algorithm Design
04/09/2001 ps | pdf MSME Policy Compilation (Please see roadmap before reading)
4/1/2002 txt Notes on MSME Compiler Implementation
05/25/2001 ps | pdf MSME Monitoring Design
June 2001 ps | pdf Multidimensional Security Policy Management for Dynamic Coalitions for DISCEX-II
11/14/2001 txt Multidimensional Security Policy Management and Enhancements for IP Security Policy (draft-ietf-ipsp-msme-00.txt)

  Presentations

Date Source Title/Description
August 2000 ps Security Policy Specification Language at IETF 48
January 2001 ppt PI Meeting
July 2001 ppt PI Meeting
December 2001 ps Multi-dimensional Security Management and Enforcement (MSME): Policy Abstraction for IPSP at IETF 52
January 2002 ps | ppt PI Meeting
July 2002 ps | ppt PI Meeting

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